We introduce a tunable measure for information leakage called maximal α-leakage. This measure quantifies the maximal gain of an adversary in inferring any (potentially random) function of a dataset from a release of the data. The inferential capability of the adversary is, in turn, quantified by a class of adversarial loss functions that we introduce as α-loss, α ∈ [1, ∞) ∪ {∞}. The choice of α determines the specific adversarial action and ranges from refining a belief (about any function of the data) for α = 1 to guessing the most likely value for α = ∞ while refining the α th moment of the belief for α in between. Maximal α-leakage then quantifies the adversarial gain under α-loss over all possible functions of the data. In particular, for the extremal values of α = 1 and α = ∞, maximal α-leakage simplifies to mutual information and maximal leakage, respectively. For α ∈ (1, ∞) this measure is shown to be the Arimoto channel capacity of order α. We show that maximal α-leakage satisfies data processing inequalities and a sub-additivity property thereby allowing for a weak composition result. Building upon these properties, we use maximal α-leakage as the privacy measure and study the problem of data publishing with privacy guarantees, wherein the utility of the released data is ensured via a hard distortion constraint. Unlike average distortion, hard distortion provides a deterministic guarantee of fidelity. We show that under a hard distortion constraint, for α > 1 the optimal mechanism is independent of α, and therefore, the resulting optimal tradeoff is the same for all values of α > 1. Finally, the tunability of maximal α-leakage as a privacy measure is also illustrated for binary data with average Hamming distortion as the utility measure.
an adversary and the legitimate parties (e.g., the wiretap channel [4] [5] [6] ) can be exploited to guarantee that no private information is leaked regardless of computational assumptions. An adversary that only observes the output of a (computationally) secure cipher or cannot overcome the information asymmetry in a wiretap-like setting does not, for all practical purposes, pose a privacy risk.
However, modern applications such as online data sharing, social networks, cloud-based services, and mobile computing have significantly increased the number of ways in which private information can leak. Services that require a user to disclose data in order to receive utility inevitably incur a privacy risk through unwanted inferences. For example, sensitive information such as political preference, medical conditions, and identity can be reliably estimated from movie ratings [7] , online shopping patterns, [8] , and via deanonymization and tracking of interactions in social network data [9] , [10] , respectively. Moreover, practical implementations of cryptographic schemes are susceptible to so-called "side-channel attacks," where sensitive information leaks through unexpected channels. For example, a malicious application may get timing characteristics [11] , [12] . In these examples, an adversary that observes information leaked through a side-channel can more reliably infer private data, such as a key or a plaintext.
Several (often overlapping) definitions of privacy/ information leakage have been proposed over the past decade. The most widely adopted measure is differential privacy (DP) [13] , [14] , which was introduced within the context of querying databases. DP seeks to ensure that changes in the database entries do not significantly influence the value of a query. A variety of information-theoretic measures have also been proposed as leakage measures. Foremost among them is mutual information (MI): its use as a privacy measure in [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] is inspired by the common appearance of MI as an operationally-meaningful quantity throughout the literature on communication systems. In a similar vein, divergence-based quantities such as total variation distance between the prior and posterior distributions [25] have also been proposed as leakage measures. Information-theoretic measures have been studied in the DP community via Rényi differential privacy which is based on Rényi divergence [26] that allow relaxing the original definition of DP in order to enable better utility guarantees. However, the gamut of information-theoretic leakage measures proposed to address the privacy problem do not yet have clear operational meanings or adversarial models in their definitions. Fig. 1 . Two privacy-guaranteed data publishing scenarios: (i) the left figure shows the privacy protection for entirely sensitive datasets, where X and Y represent the original and released data. An adversary intends to infer a function U of X from Y , andÛ is the adversary's estimation of U . Generally, the function U is unknown to the data curator/provider; (ii) the right figure shows the privacy protection for datasets consisting of non-sensitive and sensitive data, where X and S represent the non-sensitive and sensitive data in original dataset, respectively, and Y is the released version of X. The adversary intends to infer S from Y , andŜ is the adversary's estimation of S.
More recently, information-theoretic formulations have been introduced to capture privacy against a "guessing" adversary. Here, privacy is measured in terms of an adversary's gain in guessing the private information after observing disclosed data. For example, Asoodeh et al. use the probability of correctly guessing to measure privacy [27] ; and Issa et al. introduce maximal leakage (MaxL), which quantifies the maximal logarithmic gain in the probability of correctly guessing any arbitrary function of the original data from released data [28] . A related line of work includes [29] [30] [31] , where security is quantified in terms of the expected number of guesses (or moments thereof) required by an adversary to correctly identify a quantity of interest (e.g., a password or a transmitted codeword).
This work builds upon the abovementioned efforts to operationally motivate measures and presents a larger class of meaningful information-theoretic measures that can be operationally motivated in the privacy setting. To this end, we introduce a tunable loss function, namely α-loss (1 ≤ α ≤ ∞), to capture adversarial actions. In particular, for α = 1 and α = ∞ the loss function simplifies to the logarithmic loss (log-loss) [32] [33] [34] and the probability of error, 1 respectively. The choice of the loss function captures the inferential action of an adversary. Specifically, the adversarial action, henceforth referred to as inference, involves refining a posterior belief of one or more sensitive features. Adversarial gain of a computationally unbounded adversary is then simply the decrease in (inferential) loss on average as a result of a data release.
We use the α-loss function to derive two new privacy measures called α-leakage and maximal α-leakage. Specifically, α-leakage quantifies an adversary's gain in inferring a specific private attribute in the dataset; in contrast, maximal α-leakage quantifies an adversary's gain in inferring any arbitrary attribute of the dataset. In particular, maximal α-leakage includes MI and MaxL as special cases for α = 1 and α = ∞, respectively. This approach allows us to show that MaxL can be interpreted in terms of an adversary seeking to minimize the 0-1 loss function [33] , [35] (α = ∞), i.e., the adversary makes a hard decision via a maximum likelihood estimator. On the other hand, we show that when MI is used as a leakage measure (α = 1), the underlying loss function is the log-loss, that models a (soft decision) belief-refining adversary.
In addition to what the adversary observes (e.g., released census dataset or information via a side-channel), the adversary may also have access to other correlated side-information (e.g., voter record database or individual personal information in side-channel attacks); generalizing α-leakage and maximal α-leakage to model such side-information is indeed possible as recently shown by the authors in [36] ; however, this generalization is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our proposed measures can be applied to the aforementioned privacy and side-channel settings. In most non-trivial settings of data publishing, there is a fundamental privacyutility tradeoff (PUT): on the one hand, releasing data "as is" can lead to unwanted inferences of private information. On the other hand, perturbing or limiting the released data reduces its quality. We quantify PUTs for two types of data models: one in which the entire dataset is sensitive (as illustrated in Fig. 1a ) and the other in which only a subset of the dataset is sensitive (as illustrated in Fig. 1b ). Throughout this paper, we use X to denote the original data that will be released as Y via a randomized mapping; X may be entirely sensitive as in Fig. 1a , or it may be separate from the sensitive features S as in Fig. 1b . The variable U represents a specific sensitive feature of the dataset that the adversary is interested in learning. Examples of datasets wherein the entire data is sensitive include data collected by smart devices such as smartphone sensors, movie recommendation systems, where it is hard to know a priori which aspect of the data ought to be identified as sensitive. In contrast, examples of datasets with clearly defined sensitive features include census and other datasets that explicitly include personally identifiable information.
The exact nature of the PUT depends on exactly how both privacy and utility are measured. Towards an understanding of our new privacy measures, we consider PUTs in which (maximal) α-leakage is the privacy measure, and we study several options for utility measure. In general, a meaningful utility measure (between the original and released data) should require the released data to provide either (i) average-case guarantees on fidelity [18] , [25] , [27] , [37] , [38] ; or (ii) worstcase guarantees on fidelity. Indeed, requirement (i) lends itself to modeling with a large class of expected value constraints including average distortion constraints and is now well studied in information-theoretical privacy via a variety of measures such as Hamming distortion, square error and Kullback-Leibler divergence [23] , [38] [39] [40] [41] . We note that average distortion constraints are also well studied in rate-distortion theory. To capture utility requirement (ii), we introduce a hard distortion measure which constrains the privacy mechanism so that the distortion between original and released datasets is bounded with probability 1. Such an approach has also been studied in rate-distortion theory as a potential distortion measure (see, for example, [42] for the use of per symbol distortion constraints). In addition, compared to average-case distortion constraints [23] , [38] [39] [40] [41] , a hard distortion measure is quite stringent but allows the data curator to make specific, deterministic guarantees on the fidelity of the released dataset relative to the original. Such a deterministic guarantee can lead to more accurate statistical estimators, e.g., the empirical distribution estimation for publicly released datasets such as the census.
A. Contributions and Organization
The main contributions of this paper include:
• We introduce a tunable loss function, namely α-loss (1 ≤ α ≤ ∞), which captures log-loss and 0-1 loss, respectively, for extremal values of α = 1 and ∞, respectively (Sec. III-A). • Based on α-loss, we define two operational measures of information leakage: α-leakage and maximal α-leakage, and show that: (i) α-leakage equals to Arimoto mutual information of order α [43] , [44] ; and (ii) maximal α-leakage equals to MI for α = 1 and Arimoto channel capacity [44] of order α for α > 1. Note that maximal α-leakage captures MI and MaxL at the extremal values of α (Sec. III-B). The proofs of these results rely on the fact that maximizing either the Arimoto MI or the Sibson MI [45] over the input distribution yields the same quantity, the Arimoto channel capacity. • Inspired by the fact that maximal α-leakage equals to the Arimoto channel capacity, we introduce a broader class of information-leakage measures based on f -divergences, which capture maximal α-leakage as a special case (Sec. III-C); • We prove that maximal α-leakage satisfies several useful properties, including: (i) quasi-convexity, (ii) dataprocessing inequalities: post-processing inequality and linkage inequality, (iii) sub-additivity (iv) additivity for memoryless mappings (Sec. IV). • In the context of privacy-guaranteed data publishing subject to a hard distortion utility constraint on data, we solve the resulting PUT problems exactly for maximal α-leakage as well as its f -divergence-based variants (Sec. V-A). For α-leakage, which restricts leakage about specific sensitive data as shown in Fig. 1b , we provide an inner bound of the optimal PUT (Sec. V-B). In Sec. VI, we illustrate these results via two examples.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We use capital letters to represent discrete random variables, and the corresponding capital calligraphic and lower-case letters represent their finite supports and the elements of the supports, respectively. For example, for a random variable X, its support is X with any possible realization x ∈ X . In addition, we use log to represent the natural logarithm, and [a, b] to indicate the set of integers from a to b. We use | · | to indicate the cardinality of a set, e.g., |X |, and · p to represent the p-norm of a vector, e.g., for α ≥ 1, P X α ( x∈X P X (x) α ) 1 α . We begin by reviewing Rényi entropy and divergence [46] , [47] . Definition 1. Given a distribution P X , the Rényi entropy of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, ∞) is defined as
(2)
Let Q X be a distribution over the support of P X . The Rényi divergence (between P X and Q X ) of order α ∈ (0, 1)∪(1, ∞) is defined as
Both of the two quantities are defined by their continuous extensions for α = 1 and ∞. Specifically, for α = ∞, the two quantities are given by
which is called min-entropy, and
For α = 1, the Rényi entropy and divergence reduce to Shannon entropy and Kullback-Leibler divergence, respectively [43] .
The α-leakage and maximal α-leakage measures can be expressed in terms of Sibson MI [45] and Arimoto MI [44] . These quantities generalize the usual notion of MI. We review these definitions next.
Definition 2.
Let discrete random variables (X, Y ) ∼ P X,Y with P X and P Y |X as the marginal and conditional distributions, respectively, and Q Y be an arbitrary distribution over the finite support Y. The Sibson mutual information of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, ∞) is defined as
The Arimoto mutual information of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, ∞) is defined as
where H A α (X|Y ) is Arimoto conditional entropy of X given Y defined as
All of these quantities are defined by their continuous extension for α = 1 or ∞.
Note that for α = 1, both Sibson and Arimoto MIs reduce to Shannon's MI; however, for α = ∞, the Sibson MI is
and the Arimoto MI is given by
The two measures of information generalize Shannon's MI and have a number of interesting and useful properties in various problems [43] [44] [45] , [48] .
III. TUNABLE LOSS FUNCTION AND INFORMATION LEAKAGE MEASURES
Information leakage of a data release can be viewed as an increase in adversarial inference as a result of the data release. This inference performance can be precisely characterized by a loss function that an adversary minimizes. In this section, we introduce a tunable loss function, namely α-loss for α ∈ [1, ∞] , to captures a computationally unbounded adversary's inference in refining a posterior belief of one or more sensitive features from a data release, and introduce two tunable measures, called α-leakage and maximal α-leakage, respectively, to measure the corresponding information leakages due to the data release.
A. α-Loss Function
For a Markov chain X − Y −X, letX be an estimator of X and PX |Y be a strategy for estimating X from Y . We denote the probability of correctly estimating X = x given Y = y as PX |Y (x|y). The estimation strategy PX |Y is selected in order to minimize an expected loss measure. Denoting the loss function by (x, y, PX |Y ), the expected loss is given by E X, Y, PX |Y .
One formulation of the loss function is the probability of incorrectly guessing given by
such that the expected loss E 0−1 X, Y, PX |Y is the expected probability of error. Here, the optimal strategy P X |Y is the standard maximal posterior (MAP) estimator given by
which makes the loss 0−1 (x, y, P X |Y ) be either 0 or 1, and therefore, called 0-1 loss in the literature [33] , [35] . The corresponding expected loss E 0−1 X, Y, P X |Y is the minimal expected probability of error.
To measure the uncertainty for the strategy PX |Y , the logloss (used, for example, in [32] [33] [34] , [49] ) is given by
The expected loss in this case is the conditional cross-entropy, given by
Therefore, the optimal strategy is the true posterior distribution of X given Y , i.e., P X |Y = P X |Y , which makes the expected loss in (18) become the conditional entropy H (X|Y ). That is, the minimal expected log-loss is the true conditional entropy.
Note that both the 0-1 loss and log-loss functions are decreasing in the probability of correctly estimation PX |Y (x|y). Specifically, for PX |Y (x|y) = 1, both the values of 0-1 loss and α-loss are 0, and for PX |Y (x|y) = 0, the values of 0-1 loss and log-loss become 1 and ∞, respectively. To allow a continuous quantification of the loss for PX |Y (x|y) = 0 from 1 to ∞, we formally define a tunable loss function, namely α-loss, as follows.
Definition 3 (α-loss). Let random variables X, Y andX form a Markov chain X − Y −X, whereX is an estimator of X. The α-loss of the strategy PX |Y for estimating X from Y is
where α ∈ (1, ∞). It is defined by its continuous extension for α = 1 and α = ∞, respectively, and is given by
Note that for α = 1, the expression in (20) follows directly from the L'Hôpital's rule and α-loss becomes the log-loss in (16) ; and for α = ∞, the loss in (21) is exactly the probability of error in (14) , which becomes 0-1 loss for MAP estimators. Fig. 2 plots the α-loss function in (19) for different values of α. From Fig. 2 , we observe that α-loss function is decreasing and convex in the probability of correctly guessing. represents the probability of correctly guessing, i.e., p = PX |Y (x|y) with an observation Y = y and p = PX (x) without any observation.
with the optimal estimation strategy given by 2
A detailed proof is in Appendix A. Note that in (22) ,
such that exp H A ∞ (X|Y ) is the maximal expected probability of correctly guessing X from Y . Therefore, for α = ∞, the minimal expected α-loss is the minimal expected probability of error. In addition, the optimal estimation strategy in (23) becomes the true posterior distribution of X for α = 1 and the MAP estimator for α = ∞, respectively. Example 1. Let the conditional probability distribution of X given Y = y be a binomial distribution with parameters (n, p) = (20, 0.5), i.e., P X |Y (x|y) = 20
x 0.5 x 0.5 20−x for x ∈ [0, 20]. Fig. 3 shows the optimal strategies in (23) for different values of α. We observe from Fig. 3 that as α grows from 1 to ∞, the optimal strategy gradually eliminates the Fig. 3 . The optimal strategy in (23) for different α. Note that the magenta circles represent the true conditional probability P X |Y =y , which is a binomial distribution with parameters (n, p) = (20, 0.5).
less likely values of X (given y) and transforms from the true posterior distribution to the MAP estimator.
B. α-Leakage and Maximal α-Leakage
Let X and Y represent the original data and released data, respectively, and let U represent an arbitrary (potentially random) function of X that the observer (a curious or malicious user of the released data Y ) is interested in learning. In [28] , Issa et al. introduced MaxL to quantify the maximal gain in an adversary's ability of guessing U after observing Y . We review the definition below. Definition 4 ([28, Def. 1]). Given a joint distribution P X,Y on finite alphabets, the maximal leakage from X to Y is
whereÛ represents an estimator taking values from the same arbitrary finite support as U .
Note that the numerator of the logarithmic term in (25) is the maximal expected probability of correctly guessing U with Y given by
which is exactly the complement of the minimal expected 0-1 loss in guessing U with Y . Similarly, the denominator is the complement of the minimal expected 0-1 loss in guessing U without Y . Therefore, MaxL is a leakage measure related to 0-1 loss in (14) . In addition, in Def. 4, U represents any (possibly random) function of X. The numerator represents the maximal probability of correctly guessing U based on Y , while the denominator represents the maximal probability of correctly guessing U without knowing Y . Thus, MaxL quantifies the maximal logarithmic gain in guessing any possible function of X when an adversary has access to Y .
Analogously to the derivation of MaxL from 0-1 loss, we introduce α-leakage and maximal α-leakage based on α-loss (under the assumptions of discrete random variables and finite supports). The formal definitions are as follows.
Definition 5 (α-Leakage). Given a joint distribution P X,Y and an estimatorX with the same support as X, the α-leakage from X to Y is defined as
for α ∈ (1, ∞) and by the continuous extension of (27) for α = 1 and ∞.
Note that for any specific function U of X, the joint probability distribution of X and the U is known, and therefore, α-leakage can also be used to measure the the inference gain in inferring the specific function U from the released data Y . In addition, the two maximizations in the numerator and denominator of the logarithmic ratio in (27) imply the optimal adversarial actions in the sense of minimizing the expected α-loss in Lemma 1. Therefore, it limits the inference gain that an adversary can obtain by minimizing the expected α-loss, no matter the adversary has prior knowledge (i.e., the probability distribution of the original data) of the original data or not.
Whereas α-leakage captures how much an adversary can learn about X (or a specific function of X) from Y , we also wish to quantify the information leaked about any function of X through Y . To this end, we define maximal α-leakage below.
Definition 6 (Maximal α-Leakage). Given a joint distribution P X,Y on finite alphabets X × Y, the maximal α-leakage from X to Y is defined as
where 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, and U represents any function of X and takes values from an arbitrary finite alphabet.
Thus, there is a similar connection between maximal α-leakage and α-loss (in Def. 3) as that observed in (26) between MaxL and 0-1 loss, and maximal α-leakage quantifies an adversary's capability to infer any function of data X from the released Y . Making use of the result in Lemma 1, the following theorem simplifies the expression of α-leakage in (27) .
From (29) and Lemma 1, we simplify the scaled logarithm of the ratio in (27) to Arimoto MI. A detailed proof is in Appendix B, where we show that Arimoto conditional entropy and Rényi entropy capture the inference uncertainties of an adversary for knowing Y or not, respectively, and α-leakage measures the decrease in the inference uncertainty by knowing Y .
Making use of the conclusion in Thm. 1, the following theorem gives equivalent expressions for maximal α-leakage. Note that in the following theorem we use the well-known equivalence of the supremums of Sibson and Arimoto MIs [43, Thm. 5].
where PX is a probability distribution over the support of P X .
Note that maximal α-leakage is essentially the Arimoto channel capacity (with a support-set constrained input distribution) for α > 1 [44] , which is used to characterize probabilities of decoding error for scenarios in which transmission rates are higher than channel capacity. The limit of maximal α-leakage for α = 1 gives the Shannon channel capacity. Recall that the limit of α-loss in (19) leads to the log-loss (for α = 1) and 0-1 loss (for α = ∞) functions, respectively. Consequently, for α = 1 and ∞, maximal α-leakage simplifies to MI and MaxL, respectively.
A detailed proof for Thm. 2 is in Appendix C. We summarize key steps in the proof as follows: by applying Thm. 1, we write maximal α-leakage as
For α = 1, Arimoto MI is simply the Shannon's MI, and combining with the data processing inequalities, (32) simplifies to I (X; Y ). Note that for α > 1, Arimoto MI does not satisfy data processing inequalities. By using the facts that Arimoto MI and Sibson MI have the same supremum [43, Thm. 5] and that Sibson MI satisfies data processing inequalities [43, Thm. 3], we limit the supremum in (32) by sup PX I S α (X; Y ), and then, show that the upper bound sup PX I S α (X ; Y ) can be achieved by a specific U with H (X|U ) = 0. where ρ 1 , ρ 2 ∈ [0, 1] are the crossover probabilities, maximal α-leakage in (31) is given by
Example 2. Given a binary channel
which is exactly the α-leakage for the binary symmetric channel with the uniform input distribution. Fig. 4 plots the values of maximal α-leakage for example channels where ρ 1 = ρ 2 and ρ 1 = ρ 2 , and shows that the ordering of leakages for the two channels varies with α.
C. Leakage Measures Based on f -Divergence
We introduce two classes of information leakages derived from f -divergence, called f -leakage and maximal f -leakage.
The f -leakage depends on the distribution of original data, and in contrast, maximal f -divergence only depends on the support of original data. We also show the relation between the f -divergence-based measures and maximal α-leakage for α = 1 and α > 1, respectively.
Recall that for a convex function f : R + → R such that f (1) = 0, an f -divergence D f is a measure of the distance between two distributions given by
Definition 7. Given a joint distribution P X,Y = P Y |X P X and a f -divergence D f , the f -leakage is defined as
and the maximal f -leakage is defined as (38) where PX is a distribution over the support of P X .
Note that in Definition 7, maximal f -leakage (L max f ) depends on the distribution of X only through its support.
In contrast, f -leakage (L f ) depends fully on the distribution of X. Both measures depend on the chosen mechanism P Y |X .
Recall
Furthermore, for α > 1, maximal α-leakage has a one-to-one relationship with a special case of L max f in (38) for f given by
such that D f is the Hellinger divergence of order α [50] . The following lemma makes this observation precise.
Lemma 2. For discrete random variables X and Y , the max-
where (38) defined from the function given by (39) .
A detailed proof is in Appendix D. Note that substituting f α defined in (39) into (36), we can obtain the Hellinger divergences of order α > 1. Thus, from Lemma 2, for α > 1, maximal α-leakage can be transformed to the maximal f -leakage based on Hellinger divergences via a one-to-one mapping. In this sense, maximal α-leakage is a special case of maximal f -leakage.
IV. PROPERTIES OF MAXIMAL α-LEAKAGE
Thm. 1 shows that α-leakage is exactly Arimoto MI, and therefore, several basic properties of α-leakage have been shown including (i) non-negativity [43, Sec. II-A], (ii) quasiconvexity 3 in P Y |X given P X [51, Chapter 3.5], and (iii) postprocessing inequality 4 [52, Cor. 1] . We now explore proprieties of maximal α-leakage and show that its properties include: (i) quasi-convexity in the conditional distribution P Y |X ; (ii) data processing inequalities; (iii) sub-additivity (composition property [28] ) and additivity for memoryless mechanisms.
The following theorem results from the expression of maximal α-leakage in Thm. 2 as well as some known properties of Sibson MI [43] , [45] , [48] .
is monotonically non-decreasing in α;
3. satisfies data processing inequalities: let random variables X, Y, Z form a Markov chain, i.e., X − Y − Z, then
with equality if and only if X is independent of Y , and
with equality if and only if X is a deterministic function of Y . A detailed proof is in Appendix E.
Remark 1. Note that:
• Since both MI and MaxL are convex in P Y |X , L max
• The data processing inequalities in (41a) and (41b) are called post-processing inequality and linkage inequality, respectively [53] , [54] . It is worth noting that not all information leakage measures satisfy the linkage inequality [25] , [54] . Examples include α-leakage, maximal information leakage [18] , probability of correctly guessing, and DP. • From the monotonicity of maximal α-leakage and the upper bound of MaxL in [28, Lemma 1] , we know that if |Y| < |X |, the upper bound in (43) can be tighter as
with equality for α > 1 if and only if Y is a deterministic function of X.
From Thm. 2, we know that for α > 1, maximal α-leakage is the supremum of Arimoto/Sibson MI over all possible distributions on the support of original data, and therefore, is a function of a conditional probability distribution. The following theorem bounds the supremum from below by a closedform expression of the conditional probability distribution.
with equality if and only if for all x 1 ,
A detailed proof is in Appendix F. 5 For α = ∞, the I S ∞ (P X , P Y |X ) depends on the marginal distribution P X only through the support of X.
When data may be revealed multiple times (e.g., entering a password multiple times), it is essential to quantify how mechanisms are designed with maximal α leakage compose in terms of total leakage. Consider two released versions Y 1 and Y 2 of X. The following theorem limits maximal α-leakage to an adversary who has access to both Y 1 and Y 2 simultaneously.
A detailed proof is in Appendix G.
The following theorem shows the additivity of maximal α-leakage for memoryless mechanisms.
Theorem 6 (Additivity for Memoryless Mechanisms). For α ∈ [1, ∞] and a finite integer n > 0, let X n and Y n be n-length input and output, respectively, of a memoryless mechanism with no feedback, i.e.,
where X i and Y i represent the i th element of X n and Y n , respectively, such that
(2) for α = 1
with equality if and only if entries of X n are mutually independent.
A detailed proof is in Appendix H.
V. PRIVACY-UTILITY TRADEOFF WITH A HARD DISTORTION CONSTRAINT
In a privacy-guaranteed data publishing setting, a data curator/provider uses a mapping called privacy mechanism to generate distorted versions of original data for releases. The privacy mechanism determines the fidelity of the released data. With a higher fidelity, more utility is maintained, while less privacy preserved. Therefore, a privacy-utility tradeoff (PUT) problem arises in the design of the privacy mechanism.
We consider the two different data publishing scenarios shown in Figs. 1a and 1b: the first where the entirety of the dataset X is considered private, and the second where the dataset consists of two parts S and X, where only S is considered private. For the first case ( Fig. 1a ), we use maximal α-leakage as the privacy measure, thereby limiting the inference of any private information about the dataset represented by the function U . For the second case ( Fig. 1b) , we use α-leakage as the privacy measure, thereby limited the inference only of the specific private information represented by S.
We measure utility in terms of a hard distortion measure, which constrains the privacy mechanism so that the distortion between each pair of original and released data is bounded with probability 1. Unlike average distortion measures, the hard distortion measure gives all data samples the same fidelity guarantee (distortion bound), which is independent of the probabilities of the samples. Therefore, the hard distortion measure excludes the case that large distortions are applied to samples with very small probabilities, which is possible under average distortion constraints. The fidelity guarantee can lead to better performance for applications for which low probability events cannot be ignored or excluded easily (e.g., anomaly detection from released datasets or highfidelity empirical distribution estimation for census applications) but is incompatible with some privacy measures like DP and L-DP. Specifically, for the original and released data X, Y and a distortion function d(·, ·), the utility guarantee is modeled as the hard distortion constraint d(X, Y ) ≤ D with probability 1, where D is the maximal permitted distortion. In other words, if a privacy mechanism P Y |X satisfies the hard distortion constraint, given input x, the output y of the privacy mechanism must lie in a non-empty set B D (x) given by
i.e., for any
Thus, a mathematical model of the PUT problem is given by
where the set P Y |X is the collection of stochastic matrices, and the superscript and subscript of L depend on the privacy measure under consideration (see Sec. III for notation).
Remark 2. Note that given any input x, the hard distortion constraint in (52b) will force the conditional probabilities of the outputs that are not in B D (x) to be zero. Thus, this utility guarantee is incompatible with some privacy notions, which require each input to be mapped to all outputs with some positive probabilities; e.g., DP and any maximal f -leakage with f (0) = ∞.
A. PUTs for Entirely Sensitive Datasets
For the privacy-guaranteed publishing of an entirely sensitive dataset shown in Fig. 1a , we use maximal α-leakage as the privacy measure. From Section III-C, we know that maximal α-leakage is a specific case of f -leakage and maximal f -leakage (in Def. 7) for α = 1 and α > 1, respectively. Hereby, we solve the PUT problems which minimize either f -leakage or maximal f -leakage, subject to a hard distortion constraint. By applying the relations between maximal α-leakage and the f -divergence-based variants, we derive the optimal PUTs and optimal privacy mechanisms for the PUT problem with maximal α-leakage as the privacy measure. We denote an optimal PUT as PUT HD,L (·) (·) , where HD and L (·) (·) in the subscript indicate the hard distortion and the involved privacy measure, respectively.
The following theorem characterizes the optimal tradeoff, i.e., the minimal leakage for any given distortion bound D, denoted as PUT HD,L f (D), in (52) for the case that f -leakage is used as the privacy measure.
Theorem 7. For any f -leakage L f in (37) and a distortion function d(·, ·) with B D (x) in (51) , the optimal PUT in (52) is given by
Moreover, letting Q Y be the distribution achieving the infimum in (54) , an optimal mechanism P Y |X is given by
A detailed proof in Appendix I. Note that as a result of the distribution dependence of the leakage measure L f in (37), the optimal tradeoff in (54) is an expected function of X. The optimal mechanism P * Y |X (y|x) is, in fact, the normalized probability of y when the conditional support of Y given X = x is restricted to B D (x) (i.e., Y is restricted to taking values in B D (x) for a given x).
In (52), making use of maximal f -divergence as the privacy measure, the optimal PUT, denoted as PUT HD,L max f (D), with respect to the hard distortion constraint is given as the minimal leakage for any given distortion bound D in the following theorem.
Theorem 8.
For any maximal f -leakage L max f in (38) , a distortion function d(·, ·) and B D (x) in (51), the optimal PUT in (52) is given by
Moreover, letting Q Y be the distribution achieving the supremum in (58), an optimal mechanism P Y |X is given by (55) .
A detailed proof is in Appendix J. Observe that, in contrast to the optimal tradeoff PUT HD,L f for f -leakage in Thm. 7, which depends on the probability distribution P X , the optimal tradeoff PUT HD,L max f for maximal f -leakage depends only on the support of P X . This results from the fact that the maximal f -leakage L max f in (38) is the supremum over all possible probability distribution on the support of P X , and therefore, depends on P X only through the support.
The next corollary characterizes the optimal tradeoff PUT HD,L max α for maximal α-leakage. Recall that for α = 1, L max 1 equals L f with f (t) = t log t. For α > 1, from the oneto-one relationship between L max α and L max f α in (40), we know that finding PUT HD,L max α is equivalent to finding the optimal tradeoff PUT HD,L max f in (56) for L max f = L max f α . Corollary 1. For maximal α-leakage, the optimal PUT in (52) is given by
where q is defined in (58). Moreover, an optimal mechanism is given by (55) , where for α = 1, Q Y achieves the infimum in (60a); and for α > 1, Q Y achieves the supremum in (58). (54) and (57) simplify to finding an output distribution Q * Y that can be viewed as a "target" distribution, i.e., the optimal mechanism aims to produce this distribution as closely as possible, subject to the utility constraint. In particular, given an input, the optimal mechanism in (55) distributes the outputs according to Q * Y while conditioning the output to be within a ball of radius D around the input. The optimization in (58) ensures that all inputs are uniformly masked while (54) provides average guarantees.
Remark 3. The optimal PUTs in
Moreover, for any arbitrarily chosen maximal f -leakage, the optimal PUT in (57) leads to the same target distribution Q * Y given by (58). Therefore, the corresponding optimal mechanism in (55) is independent of the choice of maximal f -leakage. As a special case of (57), the optimal tradeoff in (60b), for maximal α-leakage with α > 1, is achieved by the optimal mechanism (in (55)) that is no longer depending on α. And the optimal tradeoff (in (60b)) itself is also independent of the value of α > 1.
B. PUTs for Datasets Containing Non-Sensitive Data
For datasets containing both sensitive and non-sensitive data, indicated by S and X, respectively, as shown in Fig 1b, the purpose of privacy protection is to limit information leakage of sensitive data while releasing non-sensitive data. We use α-leakage from S to Y as the privacy measure, where Y is the released version of X. Therefore, with P Y |S,X in the place of P Y |X in (52), we obtain the optimal PUT as
The following theorem bounds PUT HD,L α from below. Note that the B D in the following is the distortion ball defined in (51) . 
where the set S D (y) of s for each y is defined as
The lower bound is tight if there exists an privacy mechanism P Y |S,X ∈ P Y |S,X (D) such that (i) given (s, x), for any y with P(y|s, x) > 0,
(ii) given any y with P Y (y) > 0, for any s ∈ S D (y),
where P Y is the marginal distribution of Y from the privacy mechanism P Y |S,X and P S,X .
The proof details are in Appendix K.
Note that by using maximal α-leakage as the privacy measure, the setting for publishing datasets consisting of sensitive and non-sensitive data can be generalized to restrict leakages about all functions of the sensitive data. This will be addressed in future work.
VI. APPLICATIONS: PUTS FOR HARD AND AVERAGE DISTORTION CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we first illustrate the results of Sec. V and present the optimal PUTs for two distinct hard distortion functions. Our first choice for hard distortion, restricted to binary datasets, is the absolute distance between the types (i.e., empirical distributions) of the original and revealed (binary) datasets. This choice is motivated by the observation that, for any dataset, the type is a sufficient statistic for any function of the dataset that is unaffected by permutationfor example, mean, variance, correlation between two features. Thus, constraining the distortion between the released type and the original type, one can guarantee the utility of the released dataset for a variety of statistical applications. In Example 1 below, we derive the optimal mechanism under this distortion measure for binary datasets. Our second choice for hard distortion is the Hamming distance between the original and released datasets for discrete alphabets. This choice is motivated by the fact that a hard Hamming distortion is more relevant when the order of the entries in the dataset cannot be changed. In Example 2 below, we derive the optimal mechanism under this distortion for a dataset sampled from an arbitrary discrete alphabet. Note that, as a consequence of Corollary 1, for these examples the optimal PUT and privacy mechanism are the same for all values of α > 1.
In contrast to hard distortion measures, in Example 3, we study the PUTs that result from using average Hamming distortion as the utility measure and maximal α-leakage as the privacy measure. Due to lack of closed-form solutions, we use numerical results to highlight the dependence of both the optimal PUTs and the privacy mechanisms on α.
A. Example 1: Binary Datasets With Hard Distortion on Types
Let X n be a random dataset with n entries and Y n be the corresponding released dataset generated by a privacy mechanism P Y n |X n . Entries of both X n and Y n are from the same alphabet X . Adopting the notation of [55, Chapter 11], let P x n and P y n indicate the types of input dataset x n and output dataset y n , respectively. We define the distortion function as the distance between types, given by
and therefore, obtain PUT HD,L max α as in (59) but with datasets X n , Y n in place of single letters X, Y . Since types of n-length sequences take on only values that are multiples of 1 n , this distortion function d T takes on values of the form m n , where m ∈ [0, n].
We concentrate on binary datasets, i.e., X = {0, 1}. Note that for binary datasets, we can simply write d T (x n , y n ) = |P x n (1) − P y n (1)|. For a n-length binary dataset, the number of types is n + 1. Therefore, all input and output datasets can be categorized into n + 1 type classes defined as
Theorem 10. For binary datasets and the distortion function in (65), given integers n, m where 0 ≤ m ≤ n, the optimal tradeoff for α > 1 is
(68)
An optimal privacy mechanism maps all input datasets in a type class to a unique output dataset which is feasible and belongs to a type class in the set T given by
where l = m if n+1 2m+1 − n+1 2m+1 ≤ m 2m+1 , and otherwise, l = n − n+1 2m+1 − 1 (2m + 1). A detailed proof is in Appendix L. Note that for any x n in the type class T (i ), the corresponding output y n generated by the optimal mechanism P * Y n |X n is unique and belongs to the unique type class in T ∩ {T ( j ) : |i − j | ≤ m}. For example, if (n, m) = (9, 2), then from Thm. 10, we have PUT HD,L max α ( 2 9 ) = 1 bit and T = {T (2), T (7)}. Fig. 5 shows the optimal mechanism, which maps all input datasets in {T (i ) : i ∈ [0, 4]} (resp. {T (i ) : i ∈ [5, 9] }) to a unique output dataset in T (2) (resp. T (7)) with probability 1.
B. Example 2: Hard Hamming Distortion on Datasets
In the example, we consider hard Hamming distortion on datasets with entries from general finite alphabets. Formally, for datasets x n , y n ∈ X n , we define the Hamming distortion function as Fig. 5 . An optimal mechanism PUT HD,L max α m n for α > 1 with (n, m) = (9, 2), where rows and columns are types of X n and Y n , respectively. Note that the hard distortion forces conditional probabilities of outputs outside the feasible ball of given input to be zero. We highlight the conditional probabilities of feasible outputs in green, and give their values in the optimal mechanism. Fig. 6 . An optimal mechanism of (71) for α > 1 with (n, m) = (2, 1) and X = {0, 1, 2} where rows and columns are x n and y n , respectively. Note that we color the conditional probabilities of feasible outputs (respect to the hard Hamming distortion) and their values are the same as 0.2 in the optimal mechanism. Therefore, we obtain PUT HD,L max α as in (59) but with datasets X n , Y n in place of single letters X, Y .
Theorem 11. For datasets from a finite alphabet X and Hamming distortion function, for any integers n, m where 0 ≤ m ≤ n, the optimal tradeoff for α > 1 is
An optimal privacy mechanism maps each input x n ∈ X n uniformly to every feasible output, i.e., for all x n , y n where d H (x n , y n ) ≤ m n , P Y n |X n (y n |x n ) = 1 m i=0 ( n i )(|X |−1) i . Note that for any pair of x n and y n , the optimal mechanism P * Y n |X n (y n |x n ) is the average probability of y n when the support of Y n is restricted to B D (x n ), i.e., Y n takes values from {y n : d H (x n , y n ) ≤ m n }. The key observation to reach the conclusion in Thm. 11 is that every output dataset is Figure 7b illustrates the behavior of the crossover probabilities ρ * 1 and ρ * 2 for the optimal privacy mechanisms as a function of α.
in the same number of feasible balls, such that a uniform distribution over the output space leads to equal probability for the feasible ball of each input dataset. The proof details are in Appendix M. Fig. 6 illustrates the optimal mechanism in Thm. 11 for X = {0, 1, 2} and (n, m) = (2, 1).
Note that permuting items of a dataset does not change the type but will lead to a non-zero Hamming distortion. The distortion on types in (65) can be viewed as a relaxation of the Hamming distortion, in the sense that the set of feasible privacy mechanisms in (71) belongs to that in (67), i.e.,
Therefore, for non-binary alphabets, the result in Thm. 11 limits the minimal leakage in (67).
C. Example 3: Average Hamming Distortion on Binary Alphabet
We consider a PUT setting with maximal α-leakage as the privacy measure and average Hamming distortion as the distortion constraint. Such an average utility constraint can be relevant to data publishing settings where preserving statistics of the dataset is desired. This example also illustrates that, in contrast to the hard distortion constraint, the optimal mechanism may depend on α.
Consider the following PUT problem that minimizes maximal α-leakage subject to the average Hamming distortion constraint:
where 0 < D < 1 − max x P X (x) is the maximum permitted average Hamming distortion. We focus on the binary case: let X, Y ∈ {0, 1} where X follow the Bernoulli distribution Bern( p) (0 < p < 1), i.e., P X (1) = p. We represent the privacy mechanism P Y |X via the two crossover probabilities P Y |X (1|0) = ρ 1 and P Y |X (0|1) = ρ 2 . By solving the supremum in the expression of maximal α-leakage, for α > 1, the optimization in (73) can be written as min
(74b) Fig. 7 shows the optimal values and mechanisms in (74) for p = 0.4 and D = 0.2 or D = 0.1. From the plots, we can see that for α = 1.001, the optimal mechanism P * Y |X (represented by ρ * 1 and ρ * 2 ) is slightly different from that of mutual information [55, Figure 10 .3] due to the fact that as α tends to 1, the limit of maximal α-leakage is Shannon channel capacity instead of mutual information, i.e., lim α→1 L max
. We also observe that as α grows, the optimal crossover probabilities ρ * 1 and ρ * 2 gradually approach to 0 and D p , respectively. Therefore, for the PUT in (74), maximal α-leakage with different values of 1 < α < ∞ leads to various optimal privacy mechanisms, which can differ from that for either α = 1 or α = ∞.
It is not difficult to check that the optimal privacy mechanisms (in Fig. 7b ) for different values of α give the same probability of correctly guessing, defined as y P Y (y) max x P Y |X (y|x) [27] , which equals to 1 − D in this example. Probability of correctly guessing is, in fact, the average accuracy of estimating the value of original data X from Y when the maximal posterior (MAP) estimator is used. Therefore, if the original data X is released against an adversary who is only interested in the most likely value of X, all values of α will lead to the same privacy guarantee in the sense that the optimal mechanisms give the same average accuracy of estimation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Via α-loss (1 ≤ α ≤ ∞), we have defined two tunable measures of information leakage: α-leakage for a specific function of original data, and maximal α-leakage for any arbitrary function of original data, and proven that: (i) α-leakage equals to Arimoto mutual information for 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞; (ii) for α > 1, maximal α-leakage equals to Arimoto channel capacity; and for α = 1 and α = ∞ it simplifies to mutual information and maximal leakage, respectively. From properties of Arimoto mutual information, α-leakage is known to be quasi-convex in the conditional distribution and satisfy the post-processing inequality. For maximal α-leakage, we have proven that it is quasi-convex in the conditional distribution, and satisfies data processing inequalities as well as a composition property.
In the context of privacy-guaranteed data publishing, we have explored PUT problems for the proposed tunable leakage measures and hard distortion utility constraints. This utility constraint has the advantage that it allows the data curator/provider to make specific, deterministic guarantees on the quality of the released dataset. For maximal α-leakage, we have shown that: (i) for all α > 1, we obtain the same optimal privacy mechanism and optimal PUT, both of which are independent of the distribution of the original data; (ii) for α = 1, the optimal mechanism differs and depends on the distribution of the original data. In other words, for this hard distortion measure, maximal α-leakage behaves as either mutual information or maximal leakage. We have also demonstrated that this extremal behavior may not hold when the hard distortion constraint is replaced by an average distortion constraint (e.g., average Hamming distortion) and the source alphabet is binary. Future directions include studying PUT problems with average distortion constraints for non-binary alphabets to further explore the impact of α on the design of privacy mechanisms. APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1 For 1 < α < ∞, the minimal expected value of the α-loss in Definition 3 can be expressed as with the optimal solution P X |Y as
For α = 1, the optimal solution is P X |Y = P X |Y . For α = ∞, we have
where the integer k(y) indicates the cardinality of the set {x : x = arg max x P X |Y (x|y)}.
Applying the optimal solution P X |Y to (77), we have
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The expression (27) can be explicitly written as
To simplify the expression in (85), we need to solve the two maximizations in the logarithm. From (29) , we know that to solve the maximization in the numerator equals to find the minimal expected α-loss. Making use of the result in Lemma 1, we have that for α ∈ (1, ∞) ,
Similarly, by applying KKT conditions to the maximization in the denominator, we have that for α ∈ (1, ∞)
Therefore, we have for α ∈ (1, ∞)
(88) (89) From the continuous extensions of Arimoto MI for α = 1 and ∞, respectively, we have that for 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞, α-leakage equals to Arimoto MI.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From Thm. 1, we have for 1 ≤ α ≤ ∞,
If α = 1, we have
where the inequality is from data processing inequalities of MI [55, Thm 2.8.1]. We then prove that the upper bound I (X; Y ) in (91) can be achieved. Let U be a function of X satisfying H (X|U ) = 0. From the condition H (X|U ) = 0 and the Markov chain U − X − Y , we have
which is exactly the expression of MaxL, and therefore, we have that for α = ∞, the maximal α-leakage equals to the Sibson MI of order ∞ [28, Thm. 1], i.e.,
For α ∈ (1, ∞), we provide an upper bound for L max α (X → Y ), and then, give an achievable scheme as follows. Upper Bound: We have an upper bound of L max
where PX P X indicate that the support of PX is a subset of the support of P X . 6 In (95),Ũ −X − Y forms a Markov chain and the probability distribution ofX is constrained to be P X . The upper bound in (96) results from allowingX to be distributed arbitrarily over the support of X. The equations in (97) and (99) result from that Arimoto MI and Sibson MI of order α > 0 have the same supremum [43, Thm. 5] , which can be proved from the expressions of Arimoto and Sibson MIs as follows:
where PŨ and PŨ are probability distributions over the same support and for each u, PŨ (u) = (X ; Y ) , and then, by replacingŨ with X we have (98). Lower bound: We bound (90) from below by considering a random variable U such that U − X − Y is a Markov chain and H (X|U ) = 0. Specifically, let the alphabet U consist of U x , a collection of U mapped to a x ∈ X , i.e., U = x∈X U x with U = u ∈ U x if and only if X = x. Therefore, for the specific variable U , we have
Construct a probability distribution PX over X from P U as 6 Note that any set is also the subset of itself, such that the support ofX can be the same as that of X
Therefore,
where the last equality follows because, for any PX P X , there exists a distribution P U (u) for u ∈ U such that (105) holds; therefore, the supremum over these U in (104) is equivalent to the supremum of PX . Therefore, combining (98) and (112), we obtain (31a).
APPENDIX D PROOF FOR LEMMA 2
Define the convex function
then for the two distributions P and Q over the support Y, we have a f -divergence H α (P Q), which is the Hellinger divergence of order α [50] , given by
Therefore, the Rényi divergence can be written in terms of the Hellinger divergence as
Thus, since z → 1 α−1 log(1 + (α − 1)z) is monotonically increasing in z for α > 1, we can write maximal α-leakage as
That is, for α > 1 maximal α-leakage is a monotonic function of the Hellinger divergence-based measure.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The proof of part 1: We know that for α ≥ 1, I S α (X; Y ) is quasi-convex P Y |X for given P X [55, Thm. 2.7.4] , [48, Thm. 10] . In addition, the supremum of a set of quasiconvex functions is also quasi-convex, i.e., if the function f (a, b) is quasi-convex in b for any given a, the supremum sup a f (a, b) is also quasi-convex in b [51] . Therefore, maximal α-leakage in (31) is quasi-convex P Y |X . The proof of part 2: Let β > α ≥ 1, and P X α = arg sup P X I S α (P X , P Y |X ) for given P Y |X , such that
where (120) results from that I S α is non-decreasing in α for α > 0 [48, Thm. 4] , and the equality in (121) holds if and only if P X α = arg sup P X I β (P X , P Y |X ). The proof of part 3: Let random variables X, Y and Z form the Markov chain X − Y − Z . Making use of that Sibson MI of order α > 1 satisfies data processing inequalities [43, Thm. 3], i.e.,
we prove that maximal α-leakage satisfies data processing inequalities as follows.
We first prove (41a). Let P X = arg sup P X I S α (P X , P Z |X ). For the Markov chain X − Y − Z , we have
where the inequality in (126) results from (123). Similarly, the inequality in (41b) can be proved directly from (124). The proof of part 4: For α = 1, we have
with equality if and only if X is independent of Y [55] . For 1 < α ≤ ∞, referring to (6) and (31a) we have
where (131) results from applying Jensen's inequality to the convex function f : t → t α (t ≥ 0), such that the equality holds if and only if given any y ∈ Y, P Y |X (y|x) are the same for all x ∈ X , such that
which means X and Y are independent, i.e., P Y |X is a rank-1 row stochastic matrix.
with equality if and only if for all x, y ∈ X ×Y, the conditional probability P X |Y (x|y) is either 1 or 0. That is, L max 1 (X → Y ) ≤ H (X) with equality if and only if X is a deterministic function of Y [41, Lem. 1]. For 1 < α ≤ ∞, from the monotonicity of maximal α-leakage in α and (31a), we have
where the equality in (139) holds if and only if for every y ∈ Y, X P(y|x) = max x P(y|x), i.e., X is a deterministic function of Y . To prove that for α ∈ (1, ∞), the upper bound in (139) is achievable, we construct a mapping P X ⇐Y such that X is a deterministic function of Y . That is, for every y ∈ Y, there exists a unique x y ∈ X such that P(x y |y) = 1. Therefore, we have x y = arg x P X ⇐Y (y|x) > 0. For α ∈ (1, ∞), from (6) and (31b) we have
in addition, since the function maximized in (141) is symmetric and concave in P X , it is Schur-concave in P X , and therefore, the optimal distribution of X achieving the supreme in (141) is uniform. Thus,
Therefore, maximal α-leakage achieves its maximal value log |X | and H (P X ) for α > 1 and α = 1, respectively, if and only if X is a deterministic function of Y .
APPENDIX F PROOF FOR THEOREM 4
To prove Thm. 4, we define a divergence function k α for α > 1 and provide a lower bound for its sum in the following definition and lemma, respectively. Definition 8. Given two discrete distributions P Y and Q Y over the support Y, a divergence function k α for α > 1 is defined as
(143)
Proof: For α ≥ 1, the function f (t) = t α is convex in t ≥ 0, such that the perspective of f (t), defined as g(t, a) = a f (t/a) (a > 0), is convex in (t, a) [51, Chapter. 3.2.6]. Let t = P Y (y) and a = Q Y (y) > 0 such that the perspective function can be written as
is a sum of convex functions, and therefore, it is convex in
. From the convexity of f (t) = t α in t ≥ 0 and Jensen's inequality [51, Chapter. 3.1.8], we have that 
with equality if and only if P = P c , where P c is given by
where Z is the constant as
which guarantees that P c is a distribution.
Proof: From the definition k α in (143), we have
with equality if and only if P = P c . In addition, making use of the expression of P c and Z in (149) and (150), respectively, we have
Making use of the results in Lemma 3, we prove Thm. 4 as follows.
Proof: From Thm. 2, we have that for α > 1
For α > 1, the function f : t → 1 α−1 log t is increasing in t ≥ 0. Therefore, we simplify the optimization in (161) as
and provide a lower bound of (162) as follows. Since the divergence function k α is joint convex in the pair of distributions, the objective function in (162) is joint convex in (P Y |X , Q Y ) for fixed PX , and linear in PX for fixed (P Y |X , Q Y ).
Therefore, the max-min equals to the min-max as followed:
where the inequality in (166) is directly from (147) in Lemma 3 with equality if and only if
with the constant Z = y P Y |X (y|·) α . Therefore, for any P Y |X , we have
with equality if and only if the P Y |X guarantees that the divergence function k α (P Y |X =x P c ) are the same for all x ∈ X , i.e., the P Y |X satisfies (46) .
APPENDIX G PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Let Y 1 and Y 2 be the alphabets of Y 1 and Y 2 , respectively. For any (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ Y 1 × Y 2 , due to the Markov chain Y 1 − X − Y 2 , the corresponding entry of the conditional probability matrix of (Y 1 , Y 2 ) given X is P(y 1 y 2 |x) = P(y 1 |x)P(y 2 |x y 1 ) = P(y 1 |x)P(y 2 |x).
Therefore, for α ∈ (1, ∞)
Let K (y 1 ) = x∈X P X (x)P Y 1 |X (y 1 |x) α , for all y 1 ∈ Y 1 , such that we can construct a set of distributions over X as
Therefore, from (171), L max
where y 1 in (178) is the optimal y 1 achieving the maximum in (176). Therefore, the equality in (176) holds if and only if for all y 1 ∈ Y 1
and the equality in (179) holds if and only if the optimal solutions P X and P X of the two maximizations in (179) satisfy, for all x ∈ X ,
.
(182)
From Thm. 2, there is
For α = ∞, we also have 
APPENDIX H PROOF OF THEOREM 6
For α > 1, a function f (t) = α α−1 log t is monotonically increasing in t > 0. Therefore, to solve maximal α-leakage from X n to Y n , i.e.,
it is sufficient to prove that sup PX n y n x n P(x n )P(y n |x n ) α
For a memoryless P Y n |X n with no feedback, we simplify (192) as sup PX n y n x n P(x n , y n ) P(y n |x n ) 1−α
where • (193) is from the chain rule of probability; • (194) and (195) are directly from the mechanism has no feedback and is memoryless, respectively; • the equality in (196) holds for memoryless sources, i.e., PX i |X i−1 ,··· ,X 1 = PX i for all i ∈ [1, n]; • both (197) and (198) are from the distributive property of multiplication; • (199) is from the definition of Sibson MI in (6) and that the base of the logarithm is 2. Therefore, we have for α > 1,
That is,
For α = 1, we have 
APPENDIX I PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Given P X , the collection of stochastic matrices is denoted as P Y |X . The feasible ball B D (x) around x is defined in (51) .
For the distribution dependent PUT in (53), we have
210) is directly from the hard distortion constraint d(X; Y ) ≤ 0 such that for any y / ∈ B D (x) P Y |X (y|x) = 0, and therefore, y∈B D (x) P Y |X (y|x) = 1, • (211) is from the Jensen's inequality such that
with equality if and only if there is a mechanism P Y |X satisfying
Note that f : R + → R is a convex function, such that the function t f ( 1 t ) is convex in t ∈ R + . Therefore, the objective function in (212) is convex in Q Y . Furthermore, in (212) the feasible region of Q Y is the probability distribution simplex over the set {B D (x), x ∈ X }. For finite supports X and Y of X and Y , respectively, the set {B D (x), x ∈ X } is a compact, and therefore, the infimum in (212) is achievable.
APPENDIX J PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Given P X , the collection of stochastic matrices is denoted as P Y |X . The feasible ball B D (x) around x is defined in (51) . For the distribution independent PUT in (56), we have (B D (x) ) and
Due to the convexity of f , we have
Therefore, the function g in (226) is non-increasing, such that (225) is simplified as g(q ), where q is given by
Note that in (227), the feasible region of Q Y is the probability distribution simplex over the set {B D (x), x ∈ X }. For finite supports X and Y of X and Y , respectively, the set {B D (x), x ∈ X } is a compact, and therefore, the supremum in (227) is achievable.
APPENDIX K PROOF OF THEOREM 9 From Thm. 1, we know that for α
In addition, for α > 1, the function g : t → α 1−α log t is a monotonically non-increase function in t > 0. Therefore, the problem in (61) can be simplified to
The hard distortion on X and Y in (61) determines a collection of feasible x and therefore s for each y. We define the two collections for each y ∈ Y as
(230) Note that both sets defined above are independent of the privacy mechanism P Y |S,X .
For
where • (234) is directly from the concavity of the function g 1 : t → t 
Note that the inequality in (248) is from log-sum inequality in [55, Thm. 2.7.1], and the sufficient and necessary conditions for the equalities in (248) and (249) hold are the same as that for (234) and (237), respectively.
APPENDIX L PROOF OF THEOREM 10
Define the distortion ball for the type-distance distortion in (65) as B m (x n ) y n : |P x n (0) − P y n (0)| ≤ m n .
From Corollary 1, to find an optimal mechanism P Y n |X n , we need to find an output distribution Q Y n which optimizes (58) with x n and y n in place of x, y. Note that for the hard distortion |P x n (0) − P y n (0)| ≤ m n , all datasets in a type class share the same group of feasible output datasets, and this feasible group can be represented by output type classes. Therefore, for any x n ∈ T (i ) (i ∈ [0, n]), we rewrite B m (x n ) as B m (x n ) = B m (T (i )) |i− j |≤m j ∈[0,n] T ( j ).
We define a distribution Q T of type classes for outputs as
such that q = sup Q T min i∈[0,n] Q T (B m (T (i ))).
Note that we replace the infimum by minimum in (253) due to the fact that the infimum over finite integers equals to the minimum. The optimal distribution Q T is determined by bounding q * from above and below in (253). The upper bound is determined by restricting the optimization in (253) to a judicious choice of a small set of input types. The lower bound is a constructive scheme. We define an index set I T ⊂ [0, n] for types as
where l = m if n+1 2m+1 ≤ m+n+1 2m+1 , and otherwise, l = n − n+1 2m+1 − 1 (2m + 1). From the expression of I T in (254), we observe that: (i) the difference between adjacent elements is 2m + 1; (ii) for the first and last elements,
• if n+1 2m+1 ≤ m+n+1 2m+1 holds, the first element is m and the last element is
2m+1 > m+n+1 2m+1 holds, the last element is n and the first element is n − n + 1 2m + 1 − 1 (2m + 1)
due to the inequalities n+1 2m+1 + 1 − 1 2m+1 ≥ n+1 2m+1 > m+n+1 2m+1 for n ∈ Z ++ . Therefore, it is not difficult to see that feasible balls of input type classes indexed by I T are a partition of the set of all type classes, i.e., 
where • the inequality in (259) is from that the average probability of B m (T (i )) over i ∈ I T is no less than the minimal probability of B m (T (i )) for i ∈ I T ; • the equality in (260) is from that the cardinality of I defined in (254) is n+1 2m+1 ; • the equality in (261) is from that for any distribution over types T ( j ) with j ∈ [0, n], the sum of Q T (T ( j )) over j ∈ [0, n] is 1. To bound q from below, we construct a distribution Q T as
otherwise.
By (257) for each i ∈ [0, n], there is a unique j satisfying |i − j | ≤ m. Therefore, we bound (253) by
where the equality in (265) holds because for any i ∈ [0, n], there is only one j ∈ I T satisfying |i − j | ≤ m such that the union in (264) has exactly one element in it.
Therefore, q = n+1 2m+1 −1 and the Q T defined in (262) achieve the optimum in (253). Thus, we can derive an optimal Q Y n , which assigns the same non-zero probability to only one dataset of each type classes indexed by I T , i.e., Q Y n (y n ) = q for one y n ∈ T ( j ) for each j ∈ I T . Therefore, from (55) we have the corresponding optimal privacy mechanism, which maps all input datasets in one input type class to one feasible output dataset with probability 1.
APPENDIX M PROOF OF THEOREM 11
For the Hamming distortion function on datasets in (70), the feasible ball B m (x n ) of any dataset x n ∈ X n is given by
For each x n ∈ X n , the number of datasets having different values at exactly k > 0 different positions is n k (|X | − 1) k . Therefore, the number of elements in its feasible ball B m (x n ) is
Note that the cardinality |B m (x n )| in (267) of a feasible ball is independent of the input dataset. We denote the cardinality as N ball , i.e., N ball |B m (x n )|. Due to the symmetric property of the Hamming distortion on datasets in (70), i.e., for any two datasets x n 1 , x n 2 ∈ X n , x n 1 ∈ B D (x 2 ) if and only if x 2 ∈ B D (x 1 ), we know that each output dataset is in exactly N ball different feasible balls (the example in Fig. 6 may help to figure out the above relationships). Therefore, 
which can be satisfied by a uniform distribution over X n , i.e., Q Y n = 1 |X | n . • the equality in (272) holds because, for each y n , the number of sequences x n where d H (x n , y n ) ≤ m n is exactly N ball .
